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Six self-contained simulations of the live system - draw geofences, spoof GNSS, drive the state machine, and watch key derivation fail closed. No backend required.
Illustrative simulation only
No real cryptographic operations are performed. Ciphertext, keys and model scores are illustrative and no backend is connected. These are visual representations for educational purposes. Real implementation details are available under NDA.
Drag the device outside the authorised zone, toggle red-team attacks, and watch each gate fail in sequence. Encrypt data, then try to decrypt it from the wrong place.
"Data that only exists where you put it."
Drag the device marker
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Authorised zone: Royal Hospital Chelsea area (illustrative boundary only). Drag device outside the polygon to trigger Gate 3 failure.
6-Gate pipeline - live
Gate 0a
System State
Gate 1
Auth Token
Gate 2
Hardware (TPM)
Gate 3
Geofence
Gate 4
Time Window
Gate 5
Anti-Replay
Red Team Panel
Simulate attacksAll 6 gates satisfied - key derivation authorised
Entropy sources → HKDF-SHA-512
GNSS Signal Quality
3-constellation fusion
TPM PCR Quote
Hardware root
ML-KEM-1024 Secret
Post-quantum KEM
Define an arbitrary authorised zone by clicking the map, then drag a device across the edge. Gate 3 passes only while the device is inside the polygon you drew.
Draw your own geofence
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Add at least 3 vertices to define a boundary.
Switch between an authentic and a spoofed signal. The engine scores four independent heuristics and rejects the signal if any one falls below threshold. This is heuristic resistance that fails closed - it does not prevent jamming or spoofing at the RF layer.
Anti-spoofing engine
Carrier-to-noise consistency across tracked satellites.
GPS · Galileo · GLONASS agree on the position solution.
Natural fluctuation of signal quality over time.
Receiver clock drift and Doppler shift match physics.
Signal authentic
4 / 4 heuristics passed
All heuristics clear the threshold. GNSS context is accepted as an encryption input.
Choose a scenario and watch a LightGBM classifier and an IsolationForest anomaly detector fuse into a single threat level that informs the dynamic security posture.
Threat ensemble · ONNX
Enrolled device, inside the fence, during business hours.
Supervised threat probability
Unsupervised anomaly score
Top contributing signals
Step through the thread-safe session state machine. Only transitions in the enforced adjacency graph are permitted - there is no path that skips fence or key validation.
Session state machine
15 states · thread-safe · enforced transition graph
Initialise
Location
Geo-fence
Key
Operate
Suspend
Exit
Fresh object; no cryptographic material loaded.
Allowed transitions
Transition log (0)
No transitions yet. Advance the machine from Uninitialized.
Invalidate any single fused input and the output collapses. There is no partial decryption, no degraded mode, and no override path.
Fail-closed key derivation
Toggle any input to invalid and watch the output collapse.
Key derived
All four inputs fused through HKDF-SHA-512.
AES-256-GCM key
9F31A87D · C402E15B · 77AABED9 · 14F0C3E2
Each gate is a distinct cryptographic constraint. All six must pass simultaneously for key material to be derivable. A single gate failure halts derivation with no fallback.
Gate 0a
System state
GFAE runtime is operational and not in a degraded or lockout state.
Gate 1
Auth token
A valid, unexpired access token is bound to the enrolled identity.
Gate 2
Hardware (TPM)
The requesting device matches the enrolled TPM 2.0 attestation record.
Gate 3
Geofence
Live GNSS signal context confirms the device is within the authorised boundary.
Gate 4
Time window
The current timestamp falls within the configured authorised access epoch.
Gate 5
Anti-replay
No previously seen nonce; the request is fresh and cannot be replayed.